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L INTRODUCTION
One of the most basic characteristics of the American criminal
justice system is the so-called "presumption of innocence." While
those words are nowhere found in the Constitution of the United
States or in any state constitution, the constitutional requirement
of a fair trial, coupled with the accused's right to confront the wit-
nesses against him in a criminal prosecution, would have no mean-
ing were it not for the underlying concept of the "presumption of
innocence." Regardless of the source of this presumption which
envelopes a criminal defendant from the moment charges are lodg-
ed against him,1 the concept is now a basic characteristic of our
legal system.
A second characteristic basic to our system of criminal prosecu-
tions is that a person accused of a crime may be convicted only
upon relevant evidence proving the commission of the crime
charged.2 Furthermore, the evidence must be sufficient to estab-
* Chief Justice, Nebraska Supreme Court; B.S., 1956, J.D., 1958, University of
Nebraska.
** BA, 1974, J.D., 1980, University of Nebraska.
BA, 1976, University of Nebraska, J.D., 1980, Creighton University.
The authors wish to thank Robert F. Copple and Michael McDonough for
their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. C. McCoRMICi, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342, at 805 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
2. FED. R. EviD. 402; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-402 (Reissue 1979). Nebraska adopted
the language of federal rule 402 and many other provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in Act of May 22, 1975, L.B. 279, 1975 Neb. Laws 528 (codi-
fied at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to -1103 (Reissue 1979)). The authors' re-
search indicates that, with only a few changes, the Federal Rules of Evidence
have been adopted by twenty states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
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lish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 3-- another critical characteris-
tic of our criminal justice system.
It is fundamental that the defendant in a criminal trial cannot
be convicted solely upon the basis that he is a "bad person" and
therefore is deserving of reprobation and punishment by society.4
It is not surprising, then, that the Federal Rules of Evidence as
well as the statutes of most states, including Nebraska, provide
generally that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not ad-
missible to prove that a person acted in conformity with his or her
character.5
The basis for this rule should be obvious. Our system of crimi-
nal justice intends the government to bear a heavy burden before
one accused of a crime can be found guilty of the crime charged.
Therefore, if one charged with a crime is to have the benefit of the
Nevada, North Dakota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin.
3. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 276,
202 N.W.2d 600 (1972).
4. United States v. Bledsoe, 531 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1976) (evidence of bad acts
draws the attention of the jury away from the real issues); State v. Casados,
188 Neb. 91, 95, 195 N.W.2d 210, 213 (1972) (introduction into evidence of whol-
ly independent offenses prohibited since may result in conviction because
defendant is a bad man rather than because of his specific guilt of the offense
charged).
5. NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979) adopted the language of FED. R.
Evm. 404(b) which states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
For a general discussion of the rule and its application, see Fallon & Bursell,
Similar Fact Evidence and Corroboration, 1978 CRnm. L. REv. 188 (1978);
Kyser, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 535
(1974); Logan, Evidence of Subsequent Acts, 1934 LAw Q. REv. 386; Mount,
Ohio's "Similar Acts Statute" Another Interpretation, 9 AKRON L. REv. 316
(1975); Sklar, Similar Fact Evidence-Catchwords and Cartwheels, 23 Mc-
GLL L.J. 60 (1977); Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L.
REv. 325 (1956); Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes: Kansas Statutes Anno-
tated Section 60-455 Revisited, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 161 (1978); Comment, Ad-
missibility of Evidence Under Indiana's "Common Scheme or Plan"
Exception, 53 IND. L.J. 805 (1978); Comment, Other Crime Evidence in Louisi-
ana, 33 LA. L. REv. 614 (1973); Note, Admissibility of Other Offense Evidence
After State v. Houghton, 25 S.D.L. REV. 166 (1980); Note, Identity: A Non-Stat-
utory Exception to Other Crimes Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 1101 (1976).
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Montana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, New Mexico, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming have
adopted the exact wording of FED. R. EWiD. 404(b). Florida, Hawaii, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin have made
minor or technical changes in 404(b) while preserving the substance of the
rule.
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presumption of innocence and is to be afforded a fair and impartial
trial which our Constitution guarantees,6 the accused must be in-
sulated from factors which are irrelevant to the charges filed. Both
logic and experience compel the conclusion that confronting an ac-
cused with evidence of other bad acts irrelevant to the crime
charged often leads to interference with the accused's right to a
fair trial. Such evidence may result in a conviction, but in a system
governed by the guarantees of fair and impartial trials under due
process of law,7 the criminal trial process cannot be purely result-
oriented. It would be impossible to honor the presumption of inno-
cence if evidentiary rulings were made on the basis of a result we
decided in advance to seek.
On the other hand, some factors can never be established by
direct evidence. Thus, there developed early in the law the right to
introduce circumstantial evidence to prove a fact when direct evi-
dence could not otherwise be obtained.8 Generally, the introduc-
tion of circumstantial evidence is based upon a belief that the
existence of one fact or circumstance can justifiably compel a con-
clusion that a second fact or circumstance also exists.9 That is not
to say, however, that circumstantial evidence is always admissible.
The most important factor controlling the admissibility of circum-
stantial evidence is a requirement that it be introduced only
"under proper conditions,"o that is, it must be offered to prove an
issue in the case. This initial showing essentially amounts to dem-
onstrating a probative relationship between the fact to be proved
by circumstantial evidence and a fact at issue in the proceeding.
Such a relationship is normally inferred through the application of
logic or from a comparison with man's experience." The term
most frequently used by lawyers to describe this relationship is
"relevancy."12 Evidence that a criminal defendant has on other oc-
casions conducted himself in a reprehensible or illegal manner is
not, standing alone, probative of his guilt of a crime alleged to have
been committed on a particular occasion. That is the very essence
of the statutory prohibition against the introduction of "evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a per-
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V; NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 11-12.
7. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; NEB. CoNST. art. I, § 3.
8. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Stewart, 11 Pa. 307 (1849) (great latitude allowed in
receiving indirect, sometimes called circumstantial, evidence). The use of
circumstantial evidence had its roots in, and was made necessary because of,
the secrecy of many crimes. See Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5 (1831); Finn v. Com-
monwealth, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 701 (1827).
9. McCoRmIcK, supra note 1, § 185.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
1981]
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son in order to show that he acted in conformity tlerewith."13 But
just as the law's preference for direct evidence yields under cer-
tain conditions to allow the introduction of circumstantial evi-
dence, so, too, does the general rule against the introduction of
evidence relating to the accused's bad character or conduct con-
tain exceptions which allow such evidence to be used against a
criminal defendant in limited circumstances. 14
The most common of these exceptions is found both in Federal
Rule 404(b) and the statutes of most states, including Nebraska.15
While, as earlier noted, the statute first prohibits the introduction
of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts merely to prove an ac-
cused's propensity to commit a crime, it further provides: "It [evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts] may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident."16 Similar to the rationale underlying the ad-
mission of circumstantial evidence, the justification for the above
exceptions to the rule against the introduction into evidence of
other bad acts is based upon the reasonable conclusion estab-
lished by an analysis of human experience that people often act in
a similar manner under similar conditions. Thus, when both acts,
though separated in time, are sufficiently similar or otherwise logi-
cally related, it is possible to conclude that they were motivated by
the same particular desire to accomplish a common goal. 17
The fact that one has previously acted in a particular manner
may be reliable evidence that the actor intended to carry out a
criminal plan and may prove that the criminal motive or intent has
continued to the current act being prosecuted. The fact that a
criminal defendant was involved in a prior crime may reasonably
be considered evidence of the defendant's present knowledge that
a similar or same act committed at a later time was unlawful, and
therefore help to establish the defendant's criminal motive or in-
tent or knowledge in the crime being prosecuted. However, be-
cause evidence of other bad acts is likely to affect the deliberations
of a jury, great care must be exercised when permitting its intro-
duction, even if it appears at first blush that such evidence will aid
in convicting the accused.
As with circumstantial evidence generally, the key to admissi-
bility of evidence of other bad acts must, of necessity, be its rele-
vance to the issues being tried. Therefore, not all prior or
13. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979).
14. FED. R. EvE. 404(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979).
15. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979).
16. FED. R. EvD. 404(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979).
17. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, §§ 185, 190.
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subsequent crimes, wrongs, or acts may reasonably establish the
truth of the matter. For example, the fact that one subsequently
commits an act may not have the same effect as if one had previ-
ously committed the same act. The fact that someone may have
knowledge of a fact tomorrow, as evidenced by his behavior, does
not necessarily or logically establish that one had similar knowl-
edge yesterday.
In each instance, before evidence of another crime, wrong, or
act may be introduced, a determination should be made as to the
act's relevancy to the issues being tried. Relevancy is not limited
to the categories of exceptions described in the rule. The plain lan-
guage employed by both the federal and state statutes makes it
clear that these categories of exceptions are only for purposes of
illustration and not intended to be absolute.'8 However, an argu-
ment can be made that the categories are both closed and abso-
lute.19 The result has been that too often the admissibility of
evidence of other bad acts is based upon the relationship of the
evidence to one of the listed categories rather than its relevancy to
a fact in issue in the criminal trial. Accordingly, some courts limit
their inquiry to simply determining whether the offered evidence
of another crime, wrong, or act, prior or subsequent,20 fits into one
of the designated categories. If it does fit, the evidence is admitted.
If it does not fit, the evidence is rejected, regardless of whether the
evidence is truly relevant to the issues involved2 ' and regardless of
18. Both FED. R. EvD. 404(b) and NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979) in-
troduce their identical lists of categorical exceptions with the words "such
as," indicating that the listing is merely illustrative of the possible exceptions
to the general exclusionary rule. See McConmacx, supra note 1, § 190, at 448,
where it is stated: "Some of these purposes are listed below but warning
must be given that the list is not complete, for the range of relevancy outside
the ban is almost infinite ...." Accord, 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrCE %
404.21[2] (2d ed. 1976). Even though evidence of a purpose other than those
enumerated is admissible, the evidence must be related in nature to the
crime charged. Id. (Supp. 1980-1981).
19. The Fifth Circuit, in holding that evidence is admissible under the "itemized
exceptions," seems to imply that evidence will be admitted only if it falls
within one of the enumerated categories. See United States v. Bloom, 538
F.2d 704, 708 (5th Cir. 1976). The court in Bloom adopted a four-part test as a
prerequisite to the admission of other crimes or acts under 404(b), increased
to a five-part test in United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977). The
additional prerequisite is that the "evidence of other crimes must be intro-
duced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence." Id. at 1044. Thus, under the Fifth Circuit approach, one can argue
that the only purposes sanctioned by the rule are those which are specifically
enumerated. See also People v. Porter, 13 Ill. App. 3d 437, 300 N.E.2d 314
(1973) (evidence of other crimes inadmissible unless related to one of the
specific exceptions defined by case law).
20. See notes 71-72 & accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 59-60 & accompanying text infra.
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whether the introduction of such evidence denies the accused his
constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, unaffected by irrel-
evant but prejudicial evidence.
Relevancy is the key to the entire analysis of the admissibility
of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Therefore, the proper
inquiry is the probative relationship between the evidence and a
fact at issue in the case before the court, not the relationship of the
evidence to a categorical list of exceptions.
The purpose of this article is to carefully analyze the rule and
its exceptions so that both lawyers and judges may better deter-
mine when evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
and when the introduction of such evidence violates both the rule
and its exceptions. To properly make such an analysis, it is neces-
sary to examine the history of the rule in order to determine the
true basis for the prohibition against the introduction of evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts and the exceptions which permit
the introduction of such evidence if relevant to an issue at hand.
Also, because courts sometimes fail to distinguish between prior
and subsequent acts when considering the introduction of evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, this article will outline the
differences between prior and subsequent acts which courts
should recognize in determining admissibility. Finally, we will for-
mulate a rule which more fully reflects the true purpose and
proper application of the rule governing the introduction of evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
II. HISTORICAL NOTE
The early history of the rule prohibiting the introduction of evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts and the development of cer-
tain exceptions at common law which pre-dated the adoption of
the current federal rule is set out in two seminal articles by Julius
Stone.22 As a basis for the conclusions which will be drawn herein,
we have paraphrased certain of Stone's historical conclusions
which we believe aid in examining the rule in light of the require-
ment that, to be properly admissible, other bad acts evidence must
be relevant to an issue being tried.
In order to free ourselves from the burden of constantly defin-
ing terms, we will begin by briefly explaining the two different ap-
proaches which have developed with respect to the admissibility of
22. For a full discussion of the history of the general rule, see Stone, The Rule of
Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HIv. I. REv. 988 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as Stone, America]; Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Simi-
lar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HAv. L REV. 954 (1933) [hereinafter cited as
Stone, England].
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evidence of other bad acts. One approach, called the "inclusionary
rule," allows the admission of any evidence of other bad acts with-
out regard to categories, so long as the evidence passes the funda-
mental relevancy test.23 The other approach, called the
"exclusionary rule," prohibits the introduction of all other bad acts
evidence unless it is properly offered under one of the categorical
exceptions.24 The former is generally viewed as the English rule,
while the latter as the American rule.25 While one might conclude
that the inclusionary rule would permit the introduction of evi-
dence of other bad acts more often than the exclusionary rule, in
truth and in fact, because of the manner in which relevancy is ap-
plied by the English courts, one finds that the English inclusionary
rule may be indeed more limiting than the American exclusionary
rule.
The history of both the general rule and its exceptions long pre-
dates the Federal Rules of Evidence. Stone noted one much-
quoted passage from Foster, Crown Law,26 with respect to an early
formulation of the rule which seems to best set out the purpose of
the rule:
The rule of rejecting all manner of evidence in criminal prosecutions that
is foreign to the point in issue, is founded on sound sense and common
justice. For no man is bound at the peril of life or liberty, fortune or repu- •
tation, to answer at once and unprepared for every action of his life....
And had not those concerned in state prosecutions out of their zeal for the
publick service, sometimes stepped over this rule in the case of treasons,
it would perhaps have been needless to have made an express provision
against it in that case. Since the common-law grounded on the principles
of natural justice hath made the like provision in every other.
Writings such as Foster's Crown Law, give us some initial in-
sight into the purpose of the rule. That purpose clearly seems con-
sistent with both our historical and our modern notion of fair trial.
However, a careful examination of the statement quoted from Fos-
ter indicates that the rule prohibiting evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is based not upon a notion of fairness, but upon the
concept of relevancy. Certainly it is true that any evidence which
may result in convicting the accused may be "unfair" to the ac-
cused and therefore of some "prejudice" to him. However, such
'"prejudice" is not a concern of the rule if the evidence offered is
relevant to prove something other than the accused's propensity to
commit crime. Thus, Foster's rule prohibits only evidence of other
crimes "that is foreign to the point in issue."27 This language sup-
23. Stone, England, supra note 22, at 965, 973-74.
24. Id- at 957-58.
25. Id. at 965; Stone, America, supra note 22, at 989.
26. M. FosTER, CROWN LAw 246 (lst ed. 1762), quoted in Stone, England, supra
note 22, at 958-59 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ports the notion that Foster's rule refers to relevancy rather than
to mere evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Rex v. Cole,28 in 1810, apparently established the rule in
England that excludes other bad acts evidence which merely dem-
onstrates the propensity of a defendant to do acts similar to those
charged.29 However, the early history in England concerning the
development of a general rule governing admissibility of other bad
acts is not at all clear. Moreover, there appears to have been no
recognized or accepted rule among the early English legal text-
writers. Like many areas of the common law which just simply
grew, various ideas and concepts were applied in what appears to
be a haphazard fashion, all in the name of the same rule and all
obviously based on each writer's unique perception of what the
rule was intended to accomplish. Because some of the early state-
ments were broad generalizations, by 1830 the common under-
standing of the English rule came to be that evidence of other bad
acts was rarely, if ever, admissible.30 In truth and in fact, such was
not the case. It is, however, important to keep this perception in
mind when attempting to understand why such a rule developed
and how the American rule, though stated in one form, has been
applied by many courts in what appears to be a totally contrary
manner.
It has been suggested that in the middle of the 19th century,
beginning with the case of Regina v. Geering,31 a relaxation of the
presumed tradition of exclusion and the development of categori-
cal exceptions had begun. Stone argues forcefully that such a sug-
gestion is incorrect. He states that the judges of this period were
not consciously creating and applying exceptions to the general
rule. Rather, decisions as to the admissibility of evidence of other
bad acts were based solely on the concept of relevancy. Thus, any
conclusion that the courts of this period actually recognized the
exceptions is founded on wishful hindsight.32
The confusion concerning whether the rule in England was one
of exclusion or inclusion may be due to the fact that during the
middle of the 19th century, judges began to recognize specific ex-
ceptions to the earlier rule precluding the introduction of evidence
of other bad acts. The earliest exception apparently permitted the
admission of similar bad acts evidence to show guilty knowledge.
This exception was developed in forgery and receiving stolen prop-
28. Noted in Stone, England, supra note 22, at 959, 960-61.
29. Stone, England, supra note 22, at 959, 960-61.
30. Id. at 957.
31. 18 L.J.R. 215 (1849), cited in Stone, England, supra note 22, at 961.
32. Stone, England, supra note 22, at 961-62.
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erty cases. 3 3 The most often mentioned rationale for the exception
was the difficulty of proving such knowledge in an inherently se-
cretive crime without resort to evidence of similar bad acts com-
mitted by the accused.34
Once the courts began to think in terms of exceptions to a gen-
eral rule which would allow admissibility, there was a constantly
increasing tendency to cite precedent relating to the particular
type of case. Little by little, categories of exception began to de-
velop which permitted the evidence, if relevant, to be introduced. 35
This category development largely occurred between 1851 and
1894. Always, however, the question of relevancy was the key
which opened the gate of admissibility. Thus, the mere fact that
the evidence fell within one of the excepted categories was not
enough to allow the evidence to be admitted.36
The first clear statement that the rule had become one of exclu-
sion with a closed list of exceptions is found in the argument of
defense counsel in the case of Regina v. Winslow 3 7 in 1860. Wins-
low was followed by Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society,3 8 an
insurance fraud case, where other crime evidence was admitted to
show intent. This categorical approach continued until nearly the
end of the century. If relevant evidence fell within a category
which constituted an exception to what was otherwise regarded as
an exclusionary rule, such evidence was admissible.
At this point, the rule in England was identical to the rule in
America,39 and, except for our frequent disregard of the question
of relevancy, it is very similar to the rule in America today. How-
ever, in 1894 an English case was decided which led to the eventual
33. Id. at 963-65.
34. Id. at 963.
35. Id. at 966, 970.
36. Id. In essence, just because the evidence may have, on its face, appeared to
have fallen into the exceptions was not sufficient. The evidence had to first
be relevant to an issue of the case.
37. 8 Cox Crim. Cases 397 (1860), cited in Stone, England, supra note 22, at 968.
38. 4 L.R. 94 (C.P.D.), 14 Cox Crim. Cases 246 (1878), cited in Stone, England,
supra note 22, at 971.
39. See, e.g., State v. Bassett, 26 N.M. 476, 194 P. 867 (1921), where the court stated:
These various statements of the so-called exceptions to the general
rule are but statements that any evidence which tends to show the
guilt of the person on trial is admissible, regardless of the fact that it
may show the guilt of the defendant of another crime. If it is neces-
sary or proper to show motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident,
a common scheme or plan, the identity of the person charged, it is
necessary or proper to show the same because it tends to show the
guilt of the accused. In such cases other acts or crimes may be
shown if they are relevant, regardless of their criminal character.
Id. at 479, 194 P. at 868. See also Herman v. State, 75 Miss. 340,346,22 So. 873,
876 (1897); Copperman v. People, 56 N.Y. 591, 593 (1874).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
abandonment of the rigid categories of exceptions and the reaffir-
mation of the admissibility of all relevant other bad acts evidence
unless such evidence was relevant only with regard to the ac-
cused's propensity to commit the crime. In Makin v. Attorney Gen-
eral of New South Wales,40 the defendants were convicted of
murdering an infant left in their care. The evidence showed that
the infant had been left with the defendants and that his body was
found buried in the garden of their house. Evidence was offered
that the bodies of ten other babies were found buried in the gar-
dens of three houses where the defendants had lived. Although
there was no evidence of the cause of death in the charged offense,
the evidence of the other similar facts was admitted.
Makin established a broad rule of admissibility based on rele-
vance except where the only relevance was to show propensity to
commit a crime.4 1 Nevertheless, the Makin opinion stimulated the
continuation of the "exception" analysis in England for the next
thirty years.42 It is thought that this practice developed because
the Makin opinion listed two ways in which similar fact evidence
could be relevant: to show design and to show lack of accident.4 3
But it should be borne in mind that even though so-called excep-
tions were recognized in subsequent cases, the ultimate test in
England continued to be relevancy. The English courts freely cre-
ated new categories based on relevance: relationship in 1904;44
purpose in 1906;45 motive in 1906;46 corroboration of witness in
1909;47 passionate relationship in 1910;48 identity in 1915;49 and fact
relevant to main fact in 1915.50
Since American courts generally adopted the English law on
this subject, it is not surprising to find that the development of the
40. [18931 19 A.C. 57 (P.C.), cited in Stone, England, supra note 22, at 973.
41. Stone, England, supra note 22, at 974-75.
42. Id. at 975.
43. Id. at 974.
44. Rex v. Mean, [1904] 21 T.L.R, 172 (C.C.R.), cited in Stone, England, supra
note 22, at 975 n.95.
45. Rex v. Bond, [1906] 2 K.B. 389, cited in Stone, England, supra note 22, at 975
n.97.
46. Rex v. Bond, [1906] 2 K.B. 389, cited in Stone, England, supra note 22, at 975
n.100.
47. King v. Chitson, [1909] 2 K.B. 945, cited in Stone, England, supra note 22, at
975 n.99.
48. Alfred Stone, 6 Crim. App. 89 (1910), cited in Stone, England, supra note 22,
at 975 n.96.
49. Perkins v. Jeffery, [1915] 2 I-B. 702, cited in Stone, England, supra note 22, at
975 n.94.
50. Perkins v. Jeffery, [1915] 2 K-B. 702, cited in Stone, England, supra 22, at 975
n.98.
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American case law throughout the 19th century generally followed
the pattern established in the English cases previously discussed.
The history of the rule in America was very similar to the his-
tory of the rule in England until the turn of the 19th century.5 1
Stone observes that the pre-1840 American decisions on point gave
lip service to the English authorities upon whom the American
courts claimed to almost exclusively rely.52 However, while pur-
porting to apply the English rule, the American opinions appar-
ently transformed it into something different. The first change
came about through a relaxation of the general exclusionary rule
so as to allow the admission of similar bad acts evidence to estab-
lish guilty knowledge in inherently secretive crimes such as for-
gery, counterfeiting, and receiving stolen property.5 3 This
categorical exception approach characterizes the course of the his-
tory of the rule in America. In 1898 the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska observed: "[T]he general doctrine [excluding evidence of
other offenses] has been varied or there has been a departure
therefrom, to a greater or lesser degree in cases of a particular or
peculiar nature in some, if not all jurisdictions."5 4 But even in this
period in which the categorical exceptions emerged, relevancy con-
tinued to be the final test of admissibility.55
Although by 1840 the American rule was far from firmly estab-
lished, the concept of exceptions to a general rule of exclusion be-
gan to enter into the cases. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Stone,5 6
evidence of similar acts was admitted to show scienter in a prose-
cution for passing bad notes. The court justified this result be-
cause it fell within an exception to the general rule.57
While in England the rule continued to be founded upon a no-
tion of relevancy, in America the similar acts rule was developing
into a broad rule of exclusion with a limited number of exceptions.
American decisions indicate that the courts were moving from a
matter of strictly determining relevancy to that of determining
whether the offered evidence fit within any of the previously devel-
51. Stone, America, supra note 22, at 990-91. The rule was taken from English law
in the form which was accepted at the beginning of the 19th century. Id. at
991. As late as 1871 the typical American decisions relied more heavily on the
English cases than on the American ones. Id. at 993.
52. Stone, America, supra note 22, at 993.
53. Id. at 995. State v. Smith, 5 Day 175, 178 (Conn. 1811); State v. Van Houten, 3
N.J. (2 Pen.) 495, 497 (1810). Both are cited in Stone, America, supra note 22,
at 993.
54. Davis v. State, 54 Neb. 177, 184, 74 N.W. 599, 601 (1898).
55. See Stone, America, supra note 22, at 996-1000.
56. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 43 (1842), cited in Stone, America, supra note 22, at 992 n.30,
1033 n.96.
57. Stone, America, supra note 22, at 1003.
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oped exceptions to the rule of exclusion.5 8 It is important for fur-
ther analysis to keep in mind that as the American rule developed,
it was intended to limit admissibility to a greater extent than was
either the original American rule or the English rule. It does not,
however, appear that this goal was achieved. If evidence did not
fall within one of the enumerated categories, it was inadmissible
no matter how relevant it might be.59 If, on the other hand, evi-
dence fell into one of the enumerated categories, it was neverthe-
less admissible no matter how irrelevant or prejudicial.6o
While various exceptions to the rule against the admissibility of
evidence of other crimes have now been established by statute in
most jurisdictions,6 1 one is unable to find a specific case or series of
-cases which may be considered the progenitor of any specific ex-
ception. However, a 1921 New Mexico decision, State v. Basset,62
listed all of the exceptions as we formulate them today: motive,
intent, absence of mistake or accident, common scheme or plan,
and identity.63
The historical development of the modern list of exceptions was
just as inconsistent as were the decisions which produced the
American rule. For a time it appeared that evidence of other bad
acts was admissible only in connection with a few particular
classes of crimes.64 Another idea which found favor and which is
still applied to some of the present exceptions was that evidence of
other bad acts was never admissible unless the corpus of the
charged offense was proved. 65 Very similar was the notion that
such evidence was not admissible in crimes where the law pre-
sumed criminal intent.66
As Makin's case is considered a landmark in English law, Peo-
ple v. Molineux, 67 is thought to have been the starting point in the
development of the modern American rule and its departure from
58. Id. at 1003-04.
59. I. at 1011-16.
60. Id- at 1031-33.
61. 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 4.15, at 412 (6th ed. 1972).
62. 26 N.M. 476, 194 P. 867 (1921).
63. Id at 479, 194 P. at 868.
64. See Stone, America, supra note 22, at 1016. The first exceptions to the rule of
exclusion were limited to a few peculiar crimes such as fraud, embezzlement,
counterfeiting, or uttering a forged instrument where intent or knowledge
were key elements and were difficult to prove.
65. Id. at 1018.
66. See State v. Willson, 113 Or. 450, 492, 233 P. 259, 269-70 (1925) (an illegal abor-
tion involves no question of intent, either the act was done or it was not; as
with robbery, the act which constitutes the offense is sufficient to prove
intent).
67. 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
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English authorities.68 In Molineux the conflict between the inclu-
sionary English rule and the exclusionary American rule came
face-to-face. Molineux was indicted in connection with the poison-
ing death of Mrs. Adams. The poison was actually administered
accidently by a third person who had been the real intended vic-
tim. The prosecution was allowed to introduce statements of a dy-
ing victim in a previous poisoning incident in order to establish
defendant's motive and demonstrate the significance of some of
the circumstances surrounding the crime. However, the New York
Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible.
The case produced several opinions, one of which has become
an oft-cited authority for the modern American rule. The opinion
listed the five exceptions to the rule of exclusion which are now
enshrined in our own rules of evidence: Federal Rule 404(b) and
Nebraska Revised Statutes section 27-404(2). They were: (1) mo-
tive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) common
scheme or plan of which the charged act is a part, and (5) iden-
tity.69 The exceptions were treated by many subsequent decisions
as though they constituted an exclusive list.70 Thus the rule came
to be that all evidence of other bad acts was excluded unless rele-
vant to the five listed categories. Obviously, this rule was far more
limited than the English rule from which it emerged.
While the history of both the English and American rules may
be of particular interest to scholars of legal evolution, it further of-
fers an important lesson to the modern lawyer. The English rule,
whether viewed as inclusionary or exclusionary, has always em-
braced the concept of relevancy. Unless and until the relevancy of
the evidence to a fact in issue is established, the evidence is held
inadmissible. In contrast, as the American rule developed, it de-
parted from the general concept of relevancy and thus resulted in
three serious defects. First, case law viewed the categories, such
as those listed in Rule 404(b), as closed and absolutely exclusive.
Second, too often the question of admissibility was treated as an
issue to be decided on the basis of whether the proffered evidence
could in some manner be squeezed into one or all of the cubicles
represented by the listed exceptions. Third, the decisions made
little distinction between prior and subsequent acts.7 1 Rarely did
68. Stone, America, supra note 22, at 1023.
69. Stone, America, supra note 22, at 1025-27. See FED. R. Evm. 404(b); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979).
70. See, e.g., People v. Porter, 13 Ill. App. 3d 437, 441, 300 N.E.2d 314, 316-17 (1973)
(evidence of other crimes is not admissible unless it relates to one of the
specific exceptions); State v. Willson, 113 Or. 450,233 P. 259 (1925) (exceptions
are carefully limited and guarded by the courts, and their number should not
be increased).
71. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 246 Ark. 1151, 1154-55, 442 S.W.2d 225, 227 (1969) (evi-
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the opinions include a discussion or analysis of whether the of-
fered evidence was relevant.7 2 If we are to assure ourselves and
the participants in the American criminal justice system that what
we say about a presumption of innocence and the right to a fair
trial is indeed the truth, a careful, analytical examination of rele-
vancy must be exercised by the trial judge before evidence of other
bad acts may be admitted. Without such an approach, there is a
hollow ring to our frequent declarations that ours is not a criminal
trial process in which defendants are convicted merely because
they are "bad" people.
One need only examine the various categories to readily see
how relevancy is the touchstone of the entire rule and plays a sig-
nificant role in preventing the admission of evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts which simply tends to prejudice the trier of
fact and dim the presumption of innocence.
We shall now examine and apply the test of relevancy to the
various categories enumerated in the present exceptions to the
rule. This examination will reveal the harm which can result by
ignoring relevancy and simply applying a categorical test.
III. RELEVANCY
Federal Rule 401 and Nebraska Revised Statute section 27-401
both provide as follows: "Relevant evidence means evidence hav-
ing a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."73 If we accept
the notion that at a minimum, all evidence offered at trial must
always be relevant to be admissible, then we must read Federal
Rule 404(b) or Nebraska Revised Statute section 27-404(2) as in-
cluding Rule 401 or section 27-401.74 With that in mind, we now
turn to an examination of the various exceptions, category by cate-
dence of the same crime committed prior or subsequent to that charged is
admissible); Critchlow v. State, 264 Ind. 458, 471, 346 N.E.2d 591, 598 (1976)
(evidence is not inadmissible because the incident occurred subsequent to,
rather than prior to, the crime charged); Berlin v. State, 12 Md. App. 48, 59-60,
277 A.2d 468, 474 (1971) (evidence of prior and subsequent offenses may be
admissible).
72. See, e.g., People v. Rivers, 171 Cal. App. 2d 335, 340-41, 340 P.2d 648, 651 (1959)
(evidence of oral copulation admitted to show preparation for illegal abortion
without discussion of relevancy); State v. Williams, 307 Minn. 191, 194, 239
N.W.2d 222, 225 (1976) (evidence of other robbery at later date admissible be-
cause identity was in issue). But see People v. McCoy, 185 Cal. App. 2d 98,
105-06, 8 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (1960) (evidence of other crimes must be examined
with care to determine whether or not it is relevant to the crime charged).
73. FED. R. Evm. 401; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-401 (Reissue 1979).
74. FED. R. EvID. 404(b); NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979).
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gory, to see what, if any, limitations must be imposed when consid-
ering the admissibility of such evidence. The exceptions are proof
of: (a) motive, opportunity, and intent, (b) preparation and plan,
(c) knowledge, and (d) identity.75 We will also examine the ad-
missibility of such evidence with respect to other categories.
A. Motive or Intent
In common usage, intent and motive are not infrequently re-
garded as one and the same thing. Both are mental states. In law,
however, there is a distinction between them. Motive has been de-
fined in the law as the "reason that nudges the will and prods the
mind to indulge the criminal intent."76 Motive is "the moving
power which impels to action for a definite result."77 It is an "in-
ducement or state of feeling that impels and tempts the mind to
indulge in a criminal act."78
Intent has been defined as the "design, resolve, or determina-
tion with which a person acts. '79 Intent, in criminal law, means a
state of mind which negates accident, inadvertance, or casualty.80
Intent is the purpose with which the accused acted to use a partic-
ular means to obtain a desired result.81
If evidence of another crime, wrong, or act may not be intro-
duced in evidence to establish motive or intent unless it is relevant
as defined by Federal Rule 401, then the defendant's state of mind
at the time of the alleged act must be at issue.82 In examining
when state of mind may be proved by other acts, it is clear that
evidence of another crime, wrong, or act committed by the accused
subsequent to the act charged cannot reasonably be offered in evi-
dence to establish the fact that the accused was previously moti-
75. FED. R. Ev. 404(b) lists the exceptions as "motive, opportunity, intent, prep-
aration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." For
the purposes of this discussion, however, they are regrouped.
76. Slough & Knightly, supra note 5, at 328.
77. State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 70, 330 N.E.2d 720, 724 (1975).
78. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 396-397 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIG-
MORE]. Slough & Knightly, supra note 5, at 328 (citing J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 117-118 (3d ed. 1940)).
79. Witters v. United States, 106 F.2d 837, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
80. People v. Williams, 6 Cal. 2d 500, 58 P.2d 917 (1936); State v. Rowley, 197 Iowa
977, 195 N.W. 881 (1923); State v. O'Donnell, 176 Iowa 337, 157 N.W. 870 (1916);
J. MAY, MAY's LAw OF CRMEs § 24 (4th ed. 1938); WIGMORE, supra note 78,
§§ 300, 302, 307, 363; Slough & Knightly, supra note 5, at 328.
81. Jones v. State, 13 Ala. App. 10, 68 So. 690 (1915); Slough & Knightly, supra note
5, at 328.
82. State v. Ray, 191 Neb. 702, 217 N.W.2d 176 (1974); State v. Hoffmeyer, 187 Neb.
701, 193 N.W.2d 760 (1972); State v. Sjogren, 39 Or. App. 639, 593 P.2d 1188
(1979).
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vated or intended to commit a criminal act.83 The state of one's
mind at a subsequent time should not be admitted to establish the
state of one's mind at a prior time. Evidence of such a subsequent
act does not have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. The fact
that one was tempted to indulge in a criminal act or had a particu-
lar state of mind at a prior time may be admissible to show the
motive or intent at a subsequent time. But evidence that one was
tempted to indulge in a criminal act or had a particular state of
mind at a subsequent time cannot possibly establish either prior
motive or intent. Therefore, by employing the requirement of rele-
vancy as defined in Federal Rule 401, not all prior acts would be
admissible to prove motive or intent, and subsequent acts would
never be admissible to prove a prior motive or intent.
B. Preparation and Plan
An analysis of preparation and plan results in reaching a con-
clusion similar to that of motive and intent. Professor Wigmore, in
his now famous work on evidence, discusses plan or design in the
following manner.
The peculiarity of intent, as a factum probandum, is that an act is assumed
as done by the defendant, and the issue is as to the kind of state of mind
accompanying it. Design or plan, however (with reference to present
bearings), is not a part of the issue, an element of the criminal fact
charged, but is the preceding mental condition which evidentially points
forward to the doing of the act designed or planned.
84
By its very definition, plan or design refers to a time prior to the
commission of the act. An individual's act, committed prior to the
commission of a crime, may indeed be relevant to the issue of
preparation or plan.85 By the same token, one's act committed
subsequent to the crime charged cannot possibly be relevant to es-
tablish a prior preparation or plan and should therefore be ex-
cluded. To permit the introduction of evidence of a subsequent act
in order to establish the fact that one had a plan or design prior to
doing the accused act defies both reason and logic, and would
83. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 363 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (subsequent
acts are not probative of the intent of a prior act). But see State v. Lee, 25
Ariz. App. 208, 542 P.2d 413 (1975); People v. Tipton, 78 IM. 2d 477, 401 N.E.2d
528 (1980); State v. Hoffman, 195 Neb. 200, 237 N.W.2d 403 (1976); State v.
Dancy, 43 N.C. App. 208,258 S.E.2d 494 (1979) (subsequent acts may be admis-
sible to show intent).
84. WIGMORE, supra note 78, § 300(3), at 238.
85. State v. Barlow, 177 Conn. 391, 418 A.2d 46 (1979) (prior illegal sales of drugs
show intent to make subsequent sales); State v. Johnson, 205 Neb. 778, 290
N.W.2d 205 (1980) (forgery case).
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properly be excluded through application of the relevancy require-
ment of Federal Rule 401.
C. Knowledge
The difficulties encountered in the category "knowledge" ap-
pear to be even greater than in the categories already discussed.
An analysis of the few cases that have attempted to discuss and
define knowledge lead one to the conclusion that the introduction
of another criminal act, whether prior or subsequent, to prove the
accused's knowledge may be permitted only for the purpose of es-
tablishing the accused's knowledge that the act being committed
was unlawful and not for the purpose of establishing general
knowledge about a matter.86 The accused may claim that he acted
without knowledge that the act had criminal consequences. In
such case, the introduction of evidence of a prior crime, wrong, or
act may be relevant to establish the fact that the accused knew
that the subsequent act committed was unlawful, and thus the act
could not have been committed in an innocent state of mind. Proof
of knowledge becomes a necessity for certain offenses such as ut-
tering of forged or counterfeit paper and possessing stolen goods.87
The distinction, then, between prior and subsequent acts be-
comes even more significant with respect to the knowledge cate-
gory than perhaps any of the other categories. While there
appears to be a split of authority in this area, a majority of the
courts hold that either subsequent or prior acts are admissible to
establish knowledge. 88 In such cases the only inquiry made by the
courts is whether the two acts are too remote in time.89 A minority
86. United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1976) (prior gambling convic-
tions to show knowledge of illegal gambling); United States v. Ostrowsky, 501
F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1974) (involvement in murder shows knowledge that car
was stolen); Asher v. United States, 394 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1968) (involvement
in other robberies shows knowledge that plan to rob not hoax); State v.
Boykin, 285 Minn. 276, 172 N.W.2d 754 (1969) (knowledge that goods were sto-
len); State v. Palumbo, 113 N.H. 329, 306 A.2d 793 (1973) (knowledge that bills
were counterfeit used to prove intent to defraud); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d
1161 (Utah 1980) (prior illegal business deal used to establish knowledge of
defendant regarding illegality of present deal).
87. WIGMORE, supra note 78, § 300(1), at 237.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Cochran, 499 F.2d 380, rehearing denied, 502 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1974); cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975); Sears v. United States, 490 F.2d 150 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974); United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Hampton, 457 F.2d
299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972); Kennard v. People, 171 Colo.
194,465 P.2d 509 (1970); State v. Ellis, 208 Neb. 379,303 N.W.2d 741 (1981); State
v. Kibler, 1 Or. App. 208, 461 P.2d 72 (1969).
89. See cases cited in note 88 supra.
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of courts subscribe to the theory that subsequent acts showing
knowledge are never admissible to prove prior knowledge.9 0 It is
suggested that the minority view is clearly the correct one. What
one knows tomorrow may be learned only at that time and could
not be evidence of one's knowledge yesterday. Thus, it would defy
logic to suggest that one should be permitted to introduce evidence
of another crime, wrong, or act subsequently committed in order to
establish that the accused knew that a prior act was unlawful or
illegal.
D. Idehtity
As with knowledge, the identity exception has occasionally
been misunderstood by the courts. Wigmore notes that before evi-
dence of another crime may be introduced for purposes of identity,
the device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a
signature.91 More than a mere similarity in the classification of the
acts and attendant circumstances must be shown or the evidence
is simply not relevant within the meaning of Federal Rule 401 and
its state counterparts. This distinction is clearly noted by a deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court92 wherein the court, in re-
viewing a judgment of conviction for first degree murder, found
that evidence of a prior uncharged rape involving a different victim
was inadmissible. In refusing to admit such evidence, the court
stated:
On the issue of identity the evidence of the Lopez crime is not only cumu-
lative, it is also irrelevant. Few of the asserted similarities between the
Lopez and Santana offenses aid in placing defendant at the scene of the
alleged murder.... If the victim had been attacked in a distinctive man-
ner that was identical to a previous crime defendant had committed, then
the evidence of the other crime might have probative value. But the only
claimed connection that has any logical relevance is evidence of "sexual
activity" in both cases and the probable use of a wrench. Even if both
facts were established ... it could not reasonably be claimed that the two
offenses were committed in a particularly distinct manner that tends to
inculpate defendant. 93
Likewise, federal cases which have reviewed the question of iden-
tity have generally held that mere similarity does not establish
identity so as to permit the introduction of other crimes, acts, or
wrongs for the purpose of establishing identity. Rather, the acts
must bear such a high degree of similarity as to mark them as the
90. See, e.g., Waller v. United States, 177 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1949); Witters v.
United States, 106 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1939); State v. Tuell, 112 Ariz. 340, 541
P.2d 1142 (1975); State v. Hays, 17 Ariz. App. 202, 496 P.2d 628 (1972).
91. WIGMORE, supra note 78, §§ 306, 410-413.
92. People v. Guerrero, 16 Cal. 3d 719, 548 P.2d 366, 129 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1976).
93. Id. at 725, 548 P.2d at 369, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
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handiwork of the accused, much like a fingerprint. 94 The rationale
of the cases makes sense. Unless the crime is so distinctive in na-
ture that there is a reasonable likelihood that it could not have
been committed by anyone else, the admission of such evidence
only establishes the accused's propensity or disposition to commit
a crime and is, under the clear language of the rule or state stat-
utes, irrelevant and inadmissible. Anything less would seem to to-
tally eliminate the prohibition of Rule 404(a). Unlike the
categories previously discussed, it appears that the distinction be-
tween prior and subsequent acts, when attempting to establish
identity, is not significant.9 5 The matter of the similarity, however,
and its relevancy becomes extremely important.
The other acts offered to prove the act involved in the charged
offense must of necessity be nearly exact. For example, the mere
fact that all of the acts offered involved crimes of violence is insuffi-
cient. As noted, identity within the meaning of the federal rule is
like a fingerprint. Fingerprint evidence is admissible only because
fingerprints are so unique that they can be used to identify the ac-
cused.96 So too with the identity exception. Before evidence of an-
other crime is admissible, the crime must have been committed in
such a unique manner that one can easily recognize it as having
been committed by the accused. Otherwise the evidence will serve
merely to establish the accused's propensity to commit crimes.
E. Other Categories
Although discussion in this article has been limited to the cate-
gories suggested by the Federal Rule and the Nebraska statute, we
suggest that courts should not limit admissibility of other bad acts
evidence to those categories. 97 The language clearly indicates that
94. United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Meyers,
550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Solomon, 490 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.
Ga. 1980) (25 facts from prior crimes were the same); State v. Chance, 92 Ariz.
351, 377 P.2d 197 (1963) (same car and disguise); Henderson v. State, - Ind.
-, 403 N.E.2d 1088 (1980) (same time, appearance, and threats in separate
crimes); Randolf v. State, 266 Ind. 179, 361 N.E.2d 900 (1977) (rape under simi-
lar circumstances); People v. Williams, 15 Mich. App. 683, 167 N.W.2d 358
(1969) (similar shell casings and crime); State v. Moore, 197 Neb. 294, 249
N.W.2d 200 (1976) (same method of operation and apparel in separate rapes);
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 372 A.2d 7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (same apparel,
time of night, and area).
95. United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
96. Moenssens, Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence and Constitutional Objec-
tions to Fingerprinting Raised in Criminal and Civil Cases, 40 CL-KINT L
REV. 85, 86 (1963).
97. See United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1975); People v. Spillman, 63
Mich. App. 256, 234 N.W.2d 475 (1975); State v. Houghton, - S.D. -, 272
N.W.2d 788 (1978); McCoRmccK, supra note 1, § 190.
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the listed categories were intended to be merely illustrative. By
using the very words "it may, however, be admissible for other
purposes such as,"98 the language contemplates that evidence of
other bad acts may be introduced and admitted if relevant under
the probative test, regardless of whether it specifically falls within
one of the stated categories.
In most instances this will involve the introduction of a prior
crime, wrong, or act as opposed to a subsequent act. However, the
entire area of knowledge can be expanded by disregarding a rigid
categorical test and looking to the relevancy of the proffered other
bad acts evidence. Thus, not only could evidence of another crime
or bad act be introduced to prove the accused's knowledge that the
instant act was illegal, but also to prove his knowledge with re-
spect to a host of other issues. For example, the fact that an ac-
cused knew how to use a particular weapon in a previous crime
could be relevant to show his knowledge as to the use of the
weapon in the charged offense. While this does not fall within the
category of "knowledge" as discussed above, it would nevertheless
be relevant and admissible. So also might evidence of the commis-
sion of a prior crime or wrong be admissible to prove knowledge of
a location or the wealth of an individual.
Furthermore, the commission of a prior or subsequent crime
might be relevant and therefore admissible to prove that the ac-
cused was or was not in a particular location at or about the time
the instant crime is alleged to have been committed. The list of
possibilities may be endless.
By interpreting the catchwords as closed categories, the statute
is open to misuse as a rule of mechanical application. McCormick,
writing on this matter, states the proposition as follows:
There is an important consideration in the practice as to the admission of
evidence of other crimes which is little discussed in the opinions. This is
the question of rule versus discretion. Most of the opinions ignore the
problem and proceed on the assumption that the decision turns solely
upon the ascertainment and application of a rule. If the situation fits one
of the classes wherein the evidence has been recognized as having in-
dependent relevancy, then the evidence is received, otherwise not. This
mechanical way of handling these questions has the advantage of calling
on the judge for a minimum of personal judgment. But problems of les-
sening the dangers of prejudice without too much sacrifice of relevant evi-
dence can seldom if ever be satisfactorily solved by mechanical rules.
And so here there is danger that if the judges, trial and appellate, content
themselves with merely determining whether the particular evidence of
other crimes does or does not fit in one of the approved classes, they may
lose sight of the underlying policy of protecting the accused against unfair
prejudice. The policy may evaporate through the interstices of the
98. FED. R. Evm. 404(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979) (emphasis
supplied).
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classification. 9 9
Although McCormick is concerned primarily with the problem
that fixed categories will cause judges to admit evidence without
considering its prejudicial effect, we suggest that more impor-
tantly, fixed categories will result in the admission of evidence
without regard to its relevancy to the issues, though the end result
may be the same. One need not reach the issue of prejudice unless
and until one has concluded that the evidence is relevant. We sug-
gest that if the matter of relevancy is rigidly applied in determin-
ing whether evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts should be
admitted in evidence, the establishment of fixed categories is of
little importance, nor should it be. If, indeed, evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts which are relevant is admissible because of
the belief that it is proper circumstantial evidence, then adhering
to an established set of categories which precludes the admission
of otherwise relevant and admissible evidence should not be
permitted.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is to ignore reality to suggest that juries do not view persons
who have committed previous or subsequent crimes in a totally
different light than persons who, unknown to them, have commit-
ted such acts. As noted at the outset, the principal reason for ex-
cluding other crimes, wrongs, or acts is to preserve the impartial
attitude of the jury which is so zealously protected when the panel
is selected. Jurors are instructed to disregard everything except
that which is properly and sterilely presented at trial. Jurors are to
direct their attention solely to the issues at hand and not attempt
to balance the scales by convicting a person because of another
crime or because of a belief that the accused deserves punishment
for some other, as yet unpunished, deed.
In many modern cases, if the prosecution can in some manner
persuade the court that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
may possibly fit within any of the categories of exceptions, the evi-
dence is admitted. This results even though the prosecution can-
not articulate to which of the many exceptions the evidence is
directed or show that the evidence is relevant to the issues
involved.100
It is therefore our position and suggestion that Rule 404(b) and
99. McCoRmcK, supra note 1, § 190, at 452-53.
100. See generally United States v. Luttrell, 612 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1980); Stephens
v. State, 239 Ga. 446, 238 S.E.2d 29 (1977); Johnson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 793,
270 S.E.2d 214 (1980); State v. Masqua, 210 Kan. 419, 502 P.2d 728 (1972); State
v. Bethea, 184 Kan. 432, 337 P.2d 684 (1959); State v. Ellis, 208 Neb. 379, 303
N.W.2d 741 (1981); State v. Johnson, 205 Neb. 778, 290 N.W.2d 205 (1980); State
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its various state counterparts should be read as if providing that
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the propensity or tendency of an individual to commit a crime.
This is specifically and precisely what the words of 404(b) have
traditionally meant in the common law and what they must mean
today to be consistent with the history of the rule and the Ameri-
can notion of criminal justice. Additionally, Rule 404(b) should be
read as if providing that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
may be introduced if offered for a purpose other than to establish
the propensity or tendency of the accused to commit a crime and if
relevant to an issue in the case. Such an interpretation would
compel courts to consider relevancy as defined by the Federal Rule
or the Nebraska statute in each instance before permitting the in-
troduction of such evidence.
Thus, Rule 404 would be read as if Rule 401 were an integral
part of the rule. Rule 404(b) would be read as if it provided:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, though not admissible to prove
propensity or disposition, may be offered for other purposes if, and only if,
the evidence has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
Unless and until the court determines that the evidence is relevant
within the meaning of Rule 401, it should not be admitted. The
mere fact that the evidence seems to fit within one or more of the
categorical exceptions to Rule 404(b) does not make it relevant or
admissible. A greater burden should be placed upon prosecutors
to establish the relevance of the offered evidence so that an appel-
late court, when reviewing the evidence, can better determine the
propriety of its admission.
The final inquiry which the trial court should perform after all
is said and done is to determine whether the evidence, even
though relevant under Rule 404(b), is so highly prejudicial as to
fall within the prohibitions contemplated in the development of
Rule 403.101 If, indeed, the true purpose of Rule 404 is to be fol-
lowed and we intend to promote the basic principles of the Ameri-
can criminal justice system, Rule 404 in its entirety should be
interpreted as providing that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
propensity or disposition of a person to commit a crime. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident; provided, however, the evidence has a ten-
v. Otey, 205 Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d 36 (1979); Dooley v. State, 484 P.2d 1324 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1971).
101. See State v. Ellis, 208 Neb. 379, 390-91, 303 N.W.2d 741, 749 (1981), in which the
court held that the "other crimes" rule is a rule of relevance.
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dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence; and provided further that the evidence, even
though relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
out-weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury.
Perhaps such a rule would make it clear to the triers of fact that
severe limitations are imposed upon the admission of evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts and, to lawyers and judges, that such
evidence is not to be admitted into evidence upon a simple asser-
tion by the prosecution that somewhere in the exceptions to the
rule prohibiting such evidence one may find a cubicle into which
the offered evidence might be placed.
The basis for the rule excluding evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts has been a part of both the English common law
and the American criminal justice system for too long to be ig-
nored.102 The value and purpose of the rule, when properly ap-
plied, have proven its worth. The evils of ignoring the true
meaning of the rule have likewise been clearly established by the
cases over the years. Yet, if we believe that a fair trial is essential
to a free society, then those entrusted with the supervision of the
trial, as well as those entrusted with the review of the trial and.the
declaration of the law, must exercise great caution to see that the
historic purpose for excluding evidence intended only to prove
propensity or disposition to commit a crime and to inflame the tri-
ers of fact against the accused is maintained. A decision improp-
erly convicting an accused also convicts our criminal system and
much of what we stand for as a free and open judicial society com-
mitted to the principles of "presumption of innocence" and the un-
questioned right to a fair and impartial trial.
102. FED. R. EVIm. 403; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403 (Reissue 1979).
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